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I.  Introduction
Declining industries, worker layoffs, and factory closings are unavoidable consequences of
a continuously evolving market economy.  How efficiently does the market reallocate factors of
production to productive uses in other sectors?  Much is known about the outcomes for labor.
Studies, such as those by Topel (1990), Ruhm (1991), Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993),
and Schoeni et al (1996), estimate the effects of reallocation on individual workers.  They find
that displaced workers often experience prolonged periods of unemployment, as well as
significant losses in permanent income even after they become re-employed.  These results
suggest that labor market frictions, such as inefficient separations, search costs or industry-
specific human capital, may be impediments to the efficient reallocation of labor.
Relatively little is known, however, about the post-displacement outcomes for the other
major factor of production - physical capital.  Much capital is highly specialized, both in its
embodied technology and factor substitution possibilities and in the types of products it can
produce.  While a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work on investment behavior
has analyzed the effects of costly reversibility on the decision to invest, little direct evidence has
been offered on the efficiency with which capital is reallocated across firms and sectors.
We seek to fill this gap in the literature by providing a theory and estimates of the costs of
reallocation of capital across firms and sectors.  Our theory of used capital sales features
specificity of capital and thinness of resale markets.  We show how variations in specificity and
costs of search affect the reallocation of capital.2
Quantifying the costs of capital mobility is more difficult because of data availability.
While several data sets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Displaced Workers
Survey, allow one to track workers over time as they move between industries, we know of no
data set that tracks physical capital as it moves between industries.  Studies of depreciation, such
as those by Hulten and Wykoff (1981) and Hulten, Robertson and Wykoff (1989), use transaction
prices from used assets to determine rates of economic depreciation.  These data, however, do not
contain information on the original purchase price, nor do they link the buyers and sellers of the
assets.  Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) study capital utilization and reallocation of capital across
size classes in the automobile industry during the 1970s and 1980s.  Much of that reallocation,
though, was within firms.
Thus, to answer these questions it was necessary to construct a new data set.  We
collected confidential information from auctions of equipment from three large Southern
California aerospace plants that discontinued operations.  We then used information on sales
prices and the characteristics of buyers to determine the extent of capital mobility for this
particular industry.  We will argue below that the aerospace industry is particularly interesting
because it has undergone significant downsizing.
Our findings suggest that capital is very specialized by sector and that reallocating capital
across sectors entails real costs.  For example, we find that capital crossing industries sold for a
greater discount than capital that remained in the aerospace industry.  Furthermore, the process of
winding down operations before selling the capital resulted in significant periods of under-
utilization before the capital was finally sold.  Thus, there also appears to be a time cost to
restructuring.  On the other hand, the assumption of zero fungibility of capital is also far from3
true.  We find that capital is sold to firms in a wide range of sectors as well as in far-flung
geographical locations.
Recognizing sectoral specificity of capital has the potential to shed light on numerous
theoretical and empirical issues.  The trade theory literature has a long history of analyzing the
effects of changes in the terms of trade under the assumption of imperfect capital mobility.
1
Similarly, in the explosion of work on growth theory in the 1960s, a number of papers addressed
vintage capital, variation in the elasticity of substitution, and the macroeconomics of multiple
sectors (e.g. Stiglitz and Uzawa (1969)).  Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
macroeconomic models, on the other hand, assume that capital is perfectly malleable and can be
costlessly shifted across firms and sectors.
2  Only recently have macroeconomic models begun to
incorporate some specificity of capital, such as irreversibility or vintage effects.
3   These models
show that incorporation of heterogeneous capital can significantly change the economic
predictions of standard models.
Allowing for capital specificity may also shed light on worker reallocation.  Nadiri and
Rosen (1969) demonstrated the importance of spillover effects of adjustment costs of one factor
of production onto the behavior of another.  If job creation and destruction are intimately linked
with capital creation and destruction, then consideration of the specificity of capital may increase
our understanding of the results of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992).  Moreover, slow capital
mobility may change the predicted effects of sectoral shocks.  The lack of positive comovement
                                               
1 See, for example, Mussa (1974, 1978), Dixit (1989), Neary (1995), and Rauch (1997).
2 In fact, most real business cycle models also allow capital to be costlessly transformed into consumption goods
and back again.  A notable exception is the work of Christiano and Fisher (1995), which analyzes a two-sector
model with a consumption good sector and an investment good sector.
3 See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996), Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell
(1994), Gilchrist and Williams (1998), Coleman (1996), Faig (1997), Ejarque (1997), Cooley, Greenwood and4
between unemployment and vacancies has been taken as evidence against the hypothesis that
sectoral shifts are an important contributor to aggregate fluctuations (e.g. Abraham and Katz
(1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989)).  If, however, capital is required to create a vacancy,
then a sectoral shift may not manifest itself as an increase in vacancies in the short-run.
4
Our work is related to a growing empirical literature that demonstrates the importance of
considering the costs of disinvestment.  Caballero and Engel (1994) (using  industry-level data),
Abel and Eberly (1996) (using firm-level data), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) (using
establishment-level data), and Goolsbee and Gross (1997) (using aircraft model data) all provide
evidence that the behavior of investment is consistent with the presence of important non-
convexities in the adjustment cost function.   Pulvino’s (1996a,b) analysis of the effect of credit
constraints and bankruptcy court protection on asset sales provides further insights into the costs
of disinvestment.  Using data on the sales of aircraft by commercial airlines, he finds that capital-
constrained airlines sell their aircraft at relatively lower prices than airlines that are not
constrained.   Our empirical work provides further evidence for costs of disinvestment. In
addition, our theoretical model offers a plausible interpretation of our empirical findings, as well
as of other findings in the literature.
II.  Theoretical Framework
A.  Overview
                                                                                                                                                      
Yorukoglu (1997), and  Ramey and Shapiro (1997).  LeRoy(1983) argues that Keynes investment theory was
actually the first analysis of temporary general equilibrium under a two-sector technology with nonshiftable capital.
4 Caballero and Hammour (1996) obtain an inverse Beveridge curve from their assumption of incomplete
contracting.  Their model also has capital that is specific to the relationship, but this element alone does not
produce an inverse Beveridge curve.5
We consider the following story to be a plausible depiction of the market for used capital.
Most capital is specialized by industry, so that used capital typically has greater value inside the
industry than outside the industry.  Even within an industry, though, capital from one firm may
not be a perfect match for another firm.  Thin markets and costly search complicate the process of
finding buyers whose needs best match the capital’s characteristics.  The cost of search includes
not only monetary costs, but also the time it takes to find good matches within the industry.  As a
result, firms will not search exhaustively for the best match for all their pieces of capital. Firms
with high discount factors may resort to “fire-sales,” resulting in significantly inferior matches and
the reallocation of capital to low valued uses.
This story, which will be formalized below, contains several key assumptions.  We begin
by motivating the first assumption of sectoral specificity of capital.  We view each piece of capital
as comprising a certain set of physical characteristics.  When new capital is built for sale to a
specific sector, it will have the best match of features for that sector.  Despite the specificity of
these characteristics, capital can be reallocated across sectors.  The key is that only some of the
characteristics of a particular piece of capital will have value in another sector.
5
We illustrate this idea with an example of a wind tunnel.  A low-speed wind tunnel capable
of producing winds from 10 to 270 miles per hour was sold to a company outside of the
aerospace industry (San Diego Union-Tribune Oct. 23, 1994).  This company rents the wind
tunnel for $900 an hour to businesses such as bicycle helmet designers and architects who wish to
gauge air flows between buildings.  Most of the users require only low wind speeds and do not
                                               
5 Firms might design or purchase equipment with ex post flexibility in mind.  (In a visit to an automobile assembly
plant, we were told that the firm paid an extra 10 or 15 percent to purchase machine tools that could be easily
reconfigured.)  Even if this flexibility is built in ex ante, the capital will lose some value if the flexibility needs to
be employed ex post, except in the unlikely event that the design made the capital perfectly flexible.6
value the fact that the tunnel can produce 270 mile per hour wind speeds.  Thus, a key
characteristic of this wind tunnel – high air speeds – has no value outside of aerospace.
We also believe that thin markets for used capital are an important impediment to the
efficient reallocation of capital.   Our discussions with professional liquidators and auctioneers
suggested several transaction costs in the reallocation of capital.  Finding buyers whose needs
match the characteristics of the equipment closely is a costly and time-consuming process.  The
sale of the equipment must be advertised and the process of inspection, negotiation and capital
budgeting can be lengthy.  On the other hand, the firm can hold a public auction, which takes
place over a couple of days, but which may result in inferior matches between capital
characteristics and buyers’ needs.
Several other models in the literature incorporate some of these features.  For example,
the specialization of capital by industry is a key assumption used in the literature on debt capacity
and liquidation of assets (e.g. Williamson(1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).   In Shleifer and
Vishny’s model, capital may be sold to a lower value use outside the industry because firms inside
the industry may be credit-constrained.  In our model, capital may be allocated to low-valued uses
even with no financial market imperfections because of costs of search.
Our assumption about costly search and matching is related to the large literature on
search and matching (e.g. Stigler (1961), McCall (1970), Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1985),
Mortenson (1986)).  The structure of our model, however, contains a feature not found in other
search models (to our knowledge.)  In our model, the firm sells multiple units, whose value
depends on the total selection available.  This feature leads the firm to face a tradeoff between
selling early at a low price and preserving the selection available to high-valuation buyers.7
For those readers who wish to skip the theoretical details of the model, we briefly
summarize the theoretical results to which we allude later in the empirical section.  We show that
under certain conditions, a firm structures its capital sales to consist of two parts.  The first part,
which is called the “private liquidation sale,” is a period of search for industry insiders.  These
sales result in high value matches and a higher sales price for the capital.  The second part is a
“public auction,” which involves a large auction in which the remaining capital is sold all at once
to industry outsiders.  The amount of capital sold to insiders is positively related to the firm’s




The model analyzes the decision problem of a firm that is selling used capital.
7   Consider a
firm from sector A (aerospace) that wishes to sell a total of N units of capital so as to maximize
the expected present discounted value of revenue from the sale.  The units of capital are
heterogeneous in that each unit will have a different value for different buyers, but the seller does
not know which particular unit the buyer will prefer.  For each unit of capital, the firm can decide
whether to sell to another firm in sector A or to a firm outside of sector A, called sector O
(outsiders).
We assume that selling capital to sector A has the following structure:
                                               
6 We are indebted to Garey Ramey for very helpful suggestions for the formulation of the model.
7 We abstract from the original decision on how much capital to sell in order to concentrate on how the capital is
sold.  The expected outcomes from this second stage would certainly have a significant effect on the original
decision to install capital.  It would be straightforward to embed this second stage decision problem in a broader
model, such as the ones discussed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).8
 (i) To take a draw from sector A, the firm must pay a fixed cost C.  The firm can only
make one draw from sector A per period.
(ii)  If the firm takes a draw from sector A, there is a probability  q,  0<q £ 1, of matching
with a firm.
(iii)  If a match is made, the firm sells one unit of capital and receives RA(n).  n indexes the
remaining number of units of capital the firm has for sale at that point in time.
(iv)  RA(n) is an increasing function of n, owing to the likelihood of making a better match
when there is a greater selection of capital.
These assumptions are intended to capture the thinness of the market and the costs of matching
with other aerospace firms.
In contrast, we assume that selling capital to sector O has the following structure:
 (i) There is no cost of selling to firms in sector O and the firm may make any number of
sales during the period.
(ii) If a sale is made to a firm in sector O, the selling firm receives RO per unit of capital.
RO is independent of n.
Despite the higher costs of selling within the sector, the firm may choose to sell to other firms
within the sector if the expected returns are large enough.  Once the match is achieved, we make
the common simplifying assumption that the selling price is equal to the valuation of the buyer.
The valuations of the buyers, RA for insiders and RO for outsiders, are given as follows:
(1) RA = fA ￿ SA(n),      S n A¢ > ( ) 0
(2) RO =  fO ￿ SO,9
(3) SA(n) >  SO   for all n.
The f ’s are marginal revenue product shifters for each of the industries.  For example, a decline
in the demand for aerospace goods would be represented as a decline in fA. The S functions
denote the goodness of the match of the capital’s characteristics, and are intended to capture the
specificity of capital discussed above.
8  Even within the same industry, capital from one firm may
not be a perfect match for another firm.  We assume that the value of a match with another
industry insider rises with the selection currently available for sale, n.   As shown above in
equation (3), we also assume that it is always the case that the characteristics of the capital will be
better suited to industry insiders than industry outsiders.  If, however, fA falls far enough relative
to fO  then RA can fall below RO.
We begin the analysis by deriving value functions using backward induction from the last
unit sold.  When the firm has only one unit left for sale, it can decide to draw from the insider pool
or to sell to outsiders.  The value function evaluated at the last unit left to sell (n=1) is given by:
(4)  V(1) = Max {q  RA(1) – C + (1- q) b V(1),  RO}
The first argument in the brackets is the expected value of taking a draw from inside the industry.
The firm receives RA(1) with probability q, and must pay a cost to search of C.  There is a
probability 1 - q of not making a match, and receiving the discounted value of having one unit left
for sale the following period.  If RO is greater than the first argument in the expression, the firm
will decide to sell to outsiders.  Let that value be given by:10
(5) V R O O ( ) 1 =
If the first expression in brackets in equation (4) is greater than RO, the firm will choose to take a














If  RA(1) is sufficiently small that VA(1) < VO(1),  the firm decides to sell its last unit to outsiders.
Iterating backward from the last unit, we obtain the value of each choice when a firm is left with n
units to sell, and finds it optimal to sell the last n-1 units to outsiders.  These values are given by:
(7) V n nR O O ( ) =
(8) V n
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VO(n), the value of selling all n units to sector O now, is linear and increasing in n.  The slope is
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The following proposition establishes conditions under which the firm will sell some
equipment to each group of buyers:
                                                                                                                                                      
8 For tractability, we assume that SA(n) is a continuous function of n, even though the n’s are discrete.  We take
into account the discreteness of n in the propositions and proofs.11
Proposition 1:  (Conditions for selling to both aerospace and outsiders)
If:















(ii) V n V n or equivalently R n C n R for n N A O A O ( ) ( ), , ( ) [( ) ] . > - > - + < < q b qb 1 1 ,
then there exists some n*, 1 < n* < N, such that  V n V n A O ( * ) ( * ) - < - 1 1  and V n V n A O ( *) ( *) ‡ ,
and the optimal policy is to sell at least one unit to sector A before selling all remaining units to
outsiders.
Proof:  See the technical appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes conditions under which there will be two stages to the selling process.
Consider Figure 1, which shows graphs of VO(n) and VA(n) against n.  Note that time moves
backwards as n increases, since higher n means that the firm has more units left to sell.  The two
conditions together guarantee that VO(n) and VA(n) cross, and that there is at least one crossing
where VA(n) crosses VO(n) from below.  If the conditions hold, the first stage of the selling
process involves some search for sector A buyers, which we call the “private liquidation sale.”
The second stage involves selling all remaining units at once to sector O.  We call this stage the
“public auction.”  If it is the case that VA(n) is less than VO(n) for all n<N, then the firm will skip
the first stage and only hold the public auction.12
In general, the first stage need not involve only sales to sector A buyers.  During the first
stage, the firm is faced with the following tradeoff: Selling some units to outsiders now has the
advantage of speeding up the time when the firm can realize revenues from the public auction, but
has the disadvantage of decreasing the selection available to sector A buyers, hence reducing the
expected revenue from those sales.  When will the firm not sell units to outsiders during the
second stage?  The following lemma specifies a sufficient condition to ensure that the gains to
speeding up the process by selling to outsiders early are outweighed by the lost revenue from
selling to insiders.
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then the sale will take place in two stages, with a first stage involving only search for sector A
buyers and the second stage involving the sale of all remaining units at once to sector O.
Proof:  See the technical appendix
While this corollary is not necessary for explaining many of the empirical results, it is
useful for clarifying the effects of certain parameters on the nature of the sales process, as shown
in the following proposition.13
Proposition 2 (The effects of parameters on the structures of sales).  Assume that conditions (i)-
(iii) as well as the following condition hold:
(iv)  q b ¢ > - < < R n R forall n such that n N A O ( ) ( ) 1 1 .
Then, the firm will sell more units to sector A,
(a)  the higher is b
(b) the higher is q
(c) the lower is RO
(d) the higher is fA
Proof:  See the technical appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that as a firm becomes more patient, it will search longer for sector A
buyers and delay the public auction.  This result can explain how a firm’s discount factor
determines how much capital it sells to industry insiders.  The proposition also shows that the firm
will search longer for sector A buyers if the efficiency of searching for sector A buyers is higher
(higher q) or if the marginal revenue product of capital in sector A is higher.
9
The following corollary states how prices of capital will differ across types of buyers, and
how the sales revenue will vary with the discount factor.14
Corollary:  Under the conditions of Proposition 2, the average (undiscounted) price paid by
sector A buyers is greater than the average (undiscounted) price paid by sector O buyers.
Furthermore, a firm with a higher b will realize higher undiscounted proceeds from the sale of its
equipment.
The implications of the model will be useful for interpreting the results we present later.
The model also sheds light on several other results in the literature.  For example, Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) present several interesting anecdotes about how rapid sales of assets lead to price
discounts.   Pulvino (1997) shows that capital-constrained airlines not only sold their aircraft at
lower prices, but were more likely to sell them to industry outsiders.  Our model of thin resale
markets for heterogeneous capital provides a straightforward explanation for these results.
Searching for good match is a time-consuming process.  If the firm does not spend the time, the
capital ends up in lower valued matches and the firm receives less for its assets.
III.   Data Description
Our data consist of information on capital sales from Southern California plants belonging
to three large aerospace companies.  The aerospace industry has undergone enormous downsizing
and restructuring in the last decade.  This industry is ideal for our study because the exogeneity of
the end of the Cold War eliminates concerns about the endogeneity of demand for the output of
the factories we study and the selectivity of which equipment and which factories get liquidated.
                                                                                                                                                      
9 If we do not assume condition (iii) from the Lemma, then the results from Proposition 2 change slightly.  Instead
of specifying the effect of the parameters on the number of units sold to sector A, the weaker proposition would
specify the effect of the parameters on the point at which the firm decides to hold the final public auction,  n* - 1.15
Variations in defense spending represent major shifts in total demand for aerospace goods.
In 1987, shipments to the Department of Defense accounted for 60 percent of total shipments of
aircraft (SIC 372) and missles and space vehicles (SIC 376).
10  Furthermore, defense department
demand is highly variable.  Figure 2 shows real defense purchases of aerospace equipment over
time.  From 1977 to 1988, real purchases rose 225 percent.  From 1988 to 1995, real purchases
reversed themselves, declining back to their 1977 levels.
A Rand report by Schoeni, Dardia, McCarthy and Vernez (1996) studies the experiences
of aerospace workers over this time period, and thus is complementary to our study of capital
flows.  Using state unemployment insurance records, the authors gathered data on every worker
who was employed in the aerospace industry in California in the first quarter of 1989.   They
found that the one-third of the workers who remained with the same firm experienced an 8
percent increase in real wages through the third quarter 1994.  The other two-thirds experienced
some losses on average, though not out of line with the control group of displaced workers from
other durable goods industries.  Nevertheless, even those workers who were employed each
quarter in California after separation from their firm experienced average wage losses of  4 - 5
percent relative to their pre-separation earnings.  Furthermore, one-quarter of this group suffered
real wage losses of 15 percent or more.  Thus, these numbers are consistent with the literature
showing that displaced workers generally experience persistent income losses.
We study three of the many plants that closed in the 1990s.  All three plants were
important manufacturers of military and/or commercial airplanes, as well as missiles.  Two of the
plants were over 40 years old, and the third was about 20 years old.  At the time we obtained the
data, the third plant was in the process of slowly paring down operations, but had not completely
                                               
10 Shipments to all Federal government agencies represented 66 percent of shipments.16
closed.   In all cases, after several years of declining production and employment, the firms
decided to discontinue operations.  The decisions on all of these plants, however, came several
years after the majority of plant closures, so none of these plants was a marginal plant.
Two of the firms held their sales through the same liquidation and auction company.  Plant
1 sold equipment through private negotiation (“private liquidation sale”) over the space of four
months, and then sold the remaining equipment at a public auction that took approximately one
week. Plant 2 held no liquidation sale, but held a series of public auctions over the year and a half
that it was winding down operations.  Plant 3 held a public auction through another company. We
have obtained only data from its first auction.  All of the public auctions were conducted as
English auctions.  We were told that most of the larger items had multiple bidders.  The total
proceeds from the sales were $18.7 million and over 1,000 buyers purchased equipment.  Three
times that many buyers attended the auctions.  Hence, the markets at the auctions are fairly thick.
A significant part of the equipment sold was machine tools, such as milling machines, jig
mills and lathes.  These are the standard metal cutting and metal forming equipment used in
manufacturing aircraft parts.  But there was also a great variety of other goods sold, such as
forklifts, cranes, generators, vibratory finishers, drill bits, and even cafeteria chairs.  Thus, our
data covers a fairly wide span of equipment.
It is interesting to note that the manufacturers did not sell any buildings.
11  Not selling
buildings is not unusual for plant closings involving plants that are more than 25 years old.  Many
have found that the cost of bringing the plants up to current environmental standards (e.g.
removing asbestos) are greater than the potential sales price, so they simply raze the buildings.
12
                                               
11 We do not yet know the outcome for the buildings of Plant 3.
12 The front page of the  June 26, 1996 Wall Street Journal contains an interesting article describing the problems
faced by GM in the closing of its 100 year old Tarrytown automobile assembly plant.17
For every item sold in the liquidation sale and public auction (over 20,000 lots), we
obtained information on the complete equipment description, the sales price, and the buyer.
Using business directories, as well as direct phone calls to buyers, we assigned buyers to a four
digit SIC industry.  Buyers whose industries we could not identify accounted for less than 4
percent of total sales.  The industry information allowed us to track the dispersion of the
equipment to various industries.  For Plant 1, the selling company provided us with information
on the original purchase year and price as well as the year and cost of any refabrications or
rebuilds for almost all of the pieces of equipment that sold for $10,000 or more each.  We were
able to obtain information for 127 pieces of equipment that accounted for $6.7 million of sales.
With this information, we can estimate implied depreciation rates for the equipment sold.
The data set we have collected has features that overcome the “lemons problem” criticism
that has been made of some of the other studies of used equipment.  First, the tremendous amount
of downsizing that occurred meant that the plants that closed were not marginal plants.  Second,
the fact that the plants sold everything they owned means that there is no selection bias in the
equipment that was sold.
We will conduct three types of analyses of the data that shed light on capital mobility.
First, we will compute the distribution of sales of equipment across industries.  The extent to
which the sales are more concentrated in aerospace or manufacturing relative to the aggregate
gives an indication of the specialization of equipment.  We will also distinguish the distribution of
sales according to whether the good was sold through private negotiation or public auction.
Second, we will use the subset of sales for which we have original purchase prices to estimate a
model of economic depreciation.  We will estimate depreciation rates and compare them to others
in the literature.  Finally, we will discuss the time lags that were involved in the sale of capital.18
IV.  Empirical Results
A.  Sectoral Flows of Capital
Before we present our results on the sectoral flows of capital from the two plants, it is
useful to give an indication of the aggregate demands for equipment for comparison purposes.
The Annual Capital Expenditures Survey reports that in 1993 the aerospace industry represented
just 0.78 percent of total private expenditures on producers’ durable equipment, and just 2.5
percent of manufacturing expenditures.  Although the aerospace industry is more heavily
concentrated in California, it is unlikely that its fraction of investment was much higher, given the
downsizing that was occurring.  The manufacturing sector as a whole accounted for 32 percent of
all investment in producers’ durable equipment in 1993.
Against this backdrop, we calculate the flow across sectors of equipment from our data.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to track capital equipment as it flows out of a shrinking
industry. Using every item sold, we calculated the fraction of goods that went to each industry,
both by the value of sales and the number of buyers.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the distribution of sales of equipment by buyer industry.  Table 1
shows the results for all types of sales combined; Table 2 shows the results for the private
liquidation sales; and Table 3 shows the results for the public auctions.
Consider first Table 1.  The most important fact that emerges from the table is that almost
one-quarter of the value of sales was to other aerospace manufacturers. Thus, one-quarter of the
equipment remained in the same 3-digit industry.  If there were perfect fungibility of capital across
sectors, we would expect the equipment to have been sold in proportions similar to aggregate
equipment investment.  The fact that the sales were over 30 times more concentrated in aerospace19
relative to the aggregate is an indicator of substantial impediments to the cross-sectoral flow of
capital.
Table 1 also shows several other sectors that were major buyers.  Machinery dealers
bought 23 percent of the equipment.  Hence, we are not able to track this equipment to its final
destination.  It is likely that some of this equipment was resold to aerospace manufacturers.  The
other important set of buyers was firms in the fabricated metals and machinery industries, who
together bought 28 percent of the equipment.  Many of these industries use the types of machine
tools used by aircraft manufacturers.  Manufacturing as a whole accounted for 58 percent of sales.
In comparison to the aggregate, sales to manufacturing were almost twice as concentrated.
We also note the geographic dispersion of sales at the bottom of the table.  Over one-third
of the equipment was sold to buyers outside of California, and 4 percent was sold to buyers from
outside the United States.  This calculation of the percent sold to foreigners is probably an
underestimate.  Many sales to foreign countries go through U.S. dealers or through individuals
who serve as agents.
13
There are two ways to view these numbers.  In one sense, they show that capital is not
absolutely stationary, since more than one-third of it left California.  In another sense, though, the
fact that California accounted for a much larger share of sales than it does in the aggregate
investment data shows that there are costs to geographic mobility.  Some of the equipment, such
as the double gantry profilers, weighs several tons.
Tables 2 and 3 shows that there is a significant difference in the buyers through private
liquidation and public auction.  Table 2 shows that 66.8 percent of the sales value from the
                                               
13 According to some auctioneers, a significant part of the equipment sold at aerospace auctions was sold to foreign
manufacturers in China and India.   China obtained some weapons manufacturing equipment illegally through
individuals who attended defense industry auctions (Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1996, A1).20
liquidation sale went to other aerospace firms, whereas Table 3 shows that only 10 percent of the
public auction sales went to aerospace firms.
The theory presented in the last section is helpful for interpreting these results.  If
aerospace firms have higher valuations for the equipment, but are harder to locate due to thin
market effects, the selling firms must spend time and effort seeking out other aerospace firms.
Thus, we would expect most of the private liquidation sales to be to other aerospace firms.  When
the expected return from this process becomes low enough, the firm sells all remaining units at a
public auction.  Most of the sales at public auction are to industry outsiders.  Firms who cannot
afford to wait during the search process sell all of their equipment at public auction.
The theory can also explain why some plants had private liquidation sales and others did
not.  Plant 1 had a private liquidation sale before its public auction, whereas Plant 2 did not.  Plant
3 had an initial public auction (which constitutes our data from the plant), but planned to have a
liquidation sale later as production decreased.  At the time of its closing, Plant 1 was owned by a
firm that was cash rich.  In contrast, at the time of its closing, Plant 2 was owned by a firm that
was heavily indebted and had low bond ratings.  Plant 3 also was more heavily indebted than Plant
1.  Based on these factors, one would expect the discount factor b of the owner of Plant 1 to be
much higher than the discount factors of the owners of Plant 2 and 3.  In the model, a low enough
b  will result in no time spent searching for other buyers inside the industry.  This appears to be
exactly what happened in Plant 2.  Only 4.6 percent of Plant 2’s sales went to aerospace buyers.
In contrast, 32 percent of the sales from Plant 1 went to aerospace buyers.  We cannot attribute
the difference in sales to the difference in the composition of equipment since both appeared to
have similar types of machine tools.
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B.  Econometric Estimates of Economic Depreciation
Overview
In this section we use the subset of data from Plant 1 containing original purchase prices
to obtain estimates of the loss of value suffered by capital that must be sold as part of the
consolidation and downsizing of an industry. We begin by summarizing the data and discuss
depreciation estimates from other studies. We then estimate two types of models: a fairly standard
exponential depreciation model and a more flexible functional form model.  Both models give
similar results.
As discussed in the last section, the subset of data consists of 127 items with a total sales
value of $6.7 million.  To put the data on a current-cost basis, we reflate the original acquisition
cost plus the cost of subsequent investment for rebuilds using implicit deflators for investment
goods.
14  We used the deflator for metal working machinery investment for the machine tools and
similar equipment, the instruments investment deflator for the instruments, the deflator for
computer investment for computers, the price deflator for turbines for a generator, the deflator for
construction tractors for gas-driven forklifts, and the deflator for industrial equipment investment
for the remaining items.
Figure 3 shows a plot of the ratio of the sales price to the reflated original acquisition cost
against age.  This ratio is Brainard-Tobin’s q -- the ratio of the market value of capital to the
replacement cost.
15   The size of the circle is proportional to the original cost.
                                               
14 These data are from the BEA’s capital stock data.  We calculate the implicit deflator as the ratio of historical
cost to the chain-weighted quantity index.
15  Figure 3 does not take into account depreciation.  Also, in the figure we make no corrections for the pieces of
machinery that had later investment flows.  Both depreciation and subsequent investment are taken into account in
the econometric analysis presented below.22
Several features stand out in the data.  First, it is clear that there were several large items
with ages up to 15 years that suffered huge declines in value.  Second, some of the equipment that
was near fifty years old sold for a large fraction of its original purchase price, even after reflation.
We double-checked these data to make sure they were not errors.  We were told that there were
certain types of machinery manufactured fifty years ago that were used only by aircraft
manufacturers at the time.  Later, however, other manufacturers started using this type of
machinery, and since these exact types are no longer manufactured, many non-aircraft
manufacturers are willing to pay a high premium to acquire it.  There is also some selectivity in
these data since our sample excludes retired equipment.
Before we estimate rates of depreciation, it is useful to review estimates obtained by
others on economic depreciation rates.  Hulten and Wykoff (1981) and Hulten, Robertson and
Wykoff (1989) applied Hall’s (1971) hedonic model of asset prices to data on used capital sales to
estimate economic depreciation rates.  For example, Hulten, Robertson, and Wykoff (1989) used
data from the Machine Dealers National Association from 1954 to 1983 to estimate economic
depreciation rates for machine tools.  Their data has many more observations (almost 3,000) than
ours, but unfortunately has no information on the original cost or the industry of the buyer and
sellers. They estimate depreciation rates by using dummy variables for characteristics of
equipment.   Several of their findings are of interest.  First, geometric depreciation is a good
approximation to the estimates they obtain using more flexible functional forms.  Second, in a
summary of their work, Hulten and Wykoff (1996) report estimated depreciation rates for a
variety of equipment.  They report an annual depreciation rate of 12 percent for industrial
machinery, and rates varying from 12 to 18 percent for other equipment (excluding automobiles
and computers which have depreciation rates up to 30 percent).23
These estimated depreciation rates are not exactly what we need for comparison.  In
estimating the depreciation rates, the authors correct for sample selection problems induced by the
fact that some equipment is retired rather than sold.  Because we are only studying equipment that
is sold, we need estimates that do not correct for sample selection.  Oliner’s (1996) study
provides such estimates.  Oliner surveyed machinery dealers in the mid-1980’s and estimated a
depreciation rate of 3.5 percent for the group of machine tools still in operation. Survey
respondents indicated an average life of these machine tools of 30 years.  When he corrected for
sample selection, he found depreciation estimates of 9.5 percent.  Thus, the relevant estimate for
our comparison may be as low as 3.5 percent.
Geometric Depreciation Model
We begin by estimating a model of geometric depreciation.  For 127 pieces of equipment
representing over a third of the value of all sales, we estimated the following model that relates
the sales price to the flow of investment and the age:
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Si = price at which machine i sold
C0 = constant term
a = positive parameter
d = annual geometric depreciation rate on original cost
age(i) = age of machine i
Ii = initial purchase cost (including installation), reflated to current prices24
dr = annual geometric depreciation rate on rebuild expenditures.
age(i,j) = years since j
th rebuild of machine i
R(i,j) = expenditures for j
th rebuild of machine i, relative to current equipment price.
ei = error term
The first term in brackets in the equation is the standard formula for geometric
depreciation on a capital investment.  The second term is included to account for the rebuilds,
which constitute additional flows of investment expenditures on the same piece of equipment. 19
of the machines experienced one to three rebuilds or refabrications over the course of their use, so
we include those investment flows as well.  We assume that the error term  e  arises from different
preferences for machinery features, different outcomes in the search process, as well as
idiosyncratic differences in the rate of physical depreciation, all of which are assumed to be
independent of the original price.
Both d and a are parameters measuring economic depreciation.  Most models of
economic depreciation in the literature implicitly assume that a is unity, so that all loss of value is
related to age.  That is, most models for measuring geometric depreciation presume that Brainard-
Tobin’s q equals one.  We will show that it is important to consider losses in value that are
unrelated to age, so that a is less than unity.
Because of the linearity induced by the additional terms that allow for rebuilds, we do not
estimate equation (10) in logarithms.  Thus, we estimate the equation by nonlinear least squares,
and use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
We begin by estimating a simple model in which the rate of depreciation on rebuilds is
constrained to equal the rate of depreciation on initial investments and the values of a and d are25
common across types of equipment.  The results of this specification are presented in the first
column of Table 4.
The estimated value of d is 7.6 percent, which is within the range of estimates in the
literature.  The value of a, however, is very low, at 0.1, and is significantly different from the
commonly assumed value of unity.  Thus, the estimates imply that there is a significant decline in
value that is independent of age.  The positive constant term further implies that the returns are
proportionally greater on the less expensive items.  Thus, the estimate of a gives the marginal q,
not the average q.  The first column shows a calculation of the q for the median valued good, after
taking into account the estimated seven percent depreciation per year.  The parameter estimates
imply that Brainard-Tobin’s q is only 0.18 on the median-valued good.
16  Thus, the loss was 82
percent.
To see whether the high estimated losses were uniform across the types of capital goods,
we estimated a model in which the losses were allowed to differ across types of capital.  We
classified the equipment into three groups:  (1) machine tools; (2) structural equipment; and (3)
miscellaneous equipment.  Machine tools include equipment such as profilers and jig mills, and
represent 104 of the 127 items sold.  Structural equipment consists of two very large, complex
and expensive items that required costly disassembly and re-assembly in order to be sold.  The
miscellaneous equipment consisted mainly of instruments and a few items such as forklifts and
computers.  We allowed the constant term, the geometric depreciation rate and the a to differ for
machine tools versus miscellaneous equipment.  Because there were only two structural items, we
could not separately estimate several parameters for them.  Thus, for these two items we preset
                                               






, where  Im is the median reflated original acquisition cost.26
the geometric depreciation factor to 12 percent and estimated a separate a.  Finally, we also
allowed the depreciation rate on rebuilds to differ from the depreciation rate on initial
investments.
The second column of Table 4 shows the results of estimating the heterogeneous capital
model.  The results indicate some heterogeneity across categories.  According to the estimates,
the annual depreciation rate for machine tools is 12 percent and for miscellaneous equipment is 6
percent.  On the other hand, the a is estimated to be higher for machine tools than miscellaneous
equipment, 40 percent versus 27 percent.  Note also that the depreciation rate on investment for
rebuilds is substantially higher than the estimated depreciation rates for initial investments.
The most significant difference is between machine tools and miscellaneous equipment on
the one hand and the two pieces of structural equipment on the other.  As the table shows, the
estimated a for the structures is only 5 percent.  Because the original cost of these structures was
so great, their discounts affect the estimated discounts for all of the equipment in the
homogeneous capital model.
In fact, once we allow for a different coefficient on structures, there is not significant
evidence of differences in discounts by type of equipment.  The final column shows the estimates
from a restricted model in which the constant term, the d, and the a are constrained to be the
same for machine tools and miscellaneous equipment, but the a for the two structures is still
allowed to be different.  One cannot reject this model in favor the more general model at any
reasonable significant level.  Thus, all of the nonstructural pieces of equipment included in the
sample appear to have similar discounts and rates of depreciation.
There are several ways to calculate the losses on capital from these parameter estimates.
The estimate of a for non-structural equipment implies that even after taking into account annual27
rates of depreciation, the firm would receive only 38 cents on the marginal dollar spent on
purchasing the capital, implying a loss of 62 percent on the margin.  Because of the positive
constant term, though, the average returns were higher.  The loss on the median-valued piece of
nonstructural equipment was 53 percent.  The loss was 95 percent on the structures.
We can also compare the total revenues from the sale to the total value of the goods,
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The numerator is the sum of the sales prices, and the denominator is the replacement cost.  We
use the estimated values of d and dr from the preferred model in Table 4.  For the entire sample,
the average value of q is 0.37, implying a discount relative to replacement cost of  63 percent.  If
we omit the two structures, the average value of q is 0.57, implying a discount relative to
replacement cost of 43 percent.
We draw two conclusions from these results.  First, all types of equipment sold for
significant discounts relative to new equipment, and most of these discounts were from factors
that were independent of age.  Second, the structural pieces sold for much greater discounts than
other types of equipment.28
Discounts by Type of Buyer and Mode of Sale
We now study whether the discounts vary systematically with the industry that bought the
equipment and with the way in which it was sold.  Recall that our theoretical model predicted that
the items that sold to other aerospace firms should sell at a higher price than the items that sold
outside the industry.  The characteristics of the capital should be a better match for other firms in
the industry.  Furthermore, in the context of our model, the sales to other aerospace firms should
have occurred during the private liquidation sale.  As shown earlier in Tables 2 and 3, though,
there were some sales to outsiders during the private liquidation sale and some sales to aerospace
during the public auction.  Table 5 shows the distribution of buyer type by mode of sale and vice
versa for the sample of 127 items used in our depreciation estimates.  The calculations show that
91.5 percent of the value of aerospace purchases in this sample was through the private
liquidation sale.  The calculations also show that 75 percent of the revenue from the liquidation
sale was from sales to other aerospace firms.  Thus, the actual data does not have the complete
separation that occurs in our model.
To determine whether the identity of the buyer or the mode of sale affects the selling
price, we re-estimate the model allowing the a’s to differ according to the identity of the buyer’s
industry and the mode of sale.  We exclude the two pieces of structural equipment, which were
sold to dealers during the private liquidation sale, because they are so different from the other
equipment, and they would skew the results.
Table 6 shows several sets of results.  The first column shows an estimate of the previous
specification without the structural equipment, to serve as a baseline.  The estimated annual
depreciation rate is 12 percent on the original investment and the estimated value of a is 38
percent.  The second column shows the results from allowing the discount to vary by the identity29
of the buyer.  The estimate of a for equipment that sold to other aerospace manufacturers is 45
percent, whereas the estimated a for equipment that sold to outsiders is only 25 percent.  Both
estimates imply substantial losses in value and the difference between the two is statistically
significant at the one percent significance  level.  At the median equipment value, the estimates
imply that resale of a new piece of equipment to another aerospace firm would result in an
average return of 56 cents on the dollar, whereas resale to an outsider would yield 36 cents on the
dollar.
The third column presents estimates when the a’s are allowed to vary according to
whether the item was sold during the private liquidation sale or the public auction.  The estimated
a for the items sold during the private liquidation sale is 42 percent, which is more than twice the
estimated a of 18 percent for the items sold at the public auction.  Along with the estimated
constant term, the results imply that the loss on the median good sold at the private liquidation
sale was 46 percent, whereas the loss on the median good sold at the public auction was 69
percent.   The value of the log likelihood function is only slightly greater than the value for the
previous specification.
The last column of Table 6 presents results from a model in which the a can differ across
both buyer category and sales mode category.  The highest estimated return is for equipment that
is sold to other aerospace firms at the private liquidation sale, with an estimated value of a of 45
percent.  The next highest is sales to outsiders at the private liquidation sale, followed by sales to
outsiders at the public auction.  Interestingly, the estimate of a for sales to aerospace during the
public auction is near zero.  This result might be due to the small sample of items in this category
or to the fact that these items had very little use outside of aerospace, so that the winning bids
were very low.30
Neither the buyer model nor the sales mode model can be rejected at the five percent level
against the model that includes both distinctions.  Both models can, however, be rejected at the
ten percent level.  All of the results, however, are broadly consistent with the theoretical model
that highlights the importance of the type of buyer and the mode of sale for determining the return
on the assets.  Both the average and marginal returns on sales to industry outsiders are
significantly lower than the return on sales to industry insiders.
Flexible Functional Form Estimates
Finally, to test further the robustness of the results, we estimated models with a more
flexible functional form.  In particular, we regress the log of the ratio of the sales price to the
reflated original cost (i.e. the log of q) on the following set of variables: a quadratic in age,
dummies for aerospace buyers or private liquidation sale interacted with the quadratic in age, a
dummy variable indicating whether the equipment was rebuilt, and the log of the original real cost.
We estimate two separate models rather than the combined by buyer – by mode model because it
is easier to interpret the separate models.  We omit the two structures from the sample, and we
weight the regression by the reflated original cost of the equipment.  The quadratic in age is
included to allow for time-varying depreciation rates, which we also allow to vary according to
either the buyer’s identity or the mode of sale.  We include the log of the original real cost to
allow for the possibility that the discount varies with the original price of the equipment.
The estimated parameters from this type of model are shown in Table 7.  Several results
are noteworthy.  First, the significant negative coefficient on the log of the reflated original cost
indicates that the higher cost items suffer a greater decline in value.  This result is consistent with
the positive constant term in the geometric depreciation model.  Second, paradoxically the31
coefficient on the dummy variable for equipment that was rebuilt is negative, indicating that those
items experienced a greater decline in value.  Both the set of coefficients on aerospace and the
liquidation sale dummy interactions are jointly significant.
Because it is difficult to see the age pattern from the coefficients, we calculate the implied
rates of depreciation and plot the fitted values of q.  Table 8 shows the implied depreciation rates
by age for each case.  Figures 4 and 5 show the fitted values of the two regressions.  In each case,
we calculated the fitted values for a piece of equipment with the median reflated original cost and
which was not rebuilt.  The figures show the implied fitted ratio of sales price to cost, rather than
the log.  Each age for which we have at least one observation is represented by a point.  In Figure
4 the “A’s” indicate items bought by aerospace firms and the “O’s” indicate items bought by
outsiders.  Figure 5 shows the similar fitted values from the sales mode model.  Here the “X’s”
denote items sold at public auction and the “L’s” denote items sold at the private liquidation sale.
Consider first the patterns shown in Figure 4.  The estimates indicate that relatively recent
equipment sold to aerospace had significantly higher values of q than the recent equipment sold to
outsiders.  The values of q for aerospace, however, decline very steeply, and cross below the q for
goods sold to outsiders at about 11 years of age.  While the q’s for the goods sold to outsiders
start very low, they decline very gradually with age.  As Table 8 shows, the estimated annual rates
of depreciation for equipment that sells to aerospace is greater than 15 percent for the first ten
years, where as the rates are less than half that for equipment sold to outsiders.  Thus, these
estimates show that the pattern of discounts is much richer than that suggested by the geometric
depreciation model.  The basic conclusions from the earlier model, however, remain unchanged:
the selling company made significantly higher returns on the items sold to other aerospace firms.32
Figure 5 shows the patterns for the mode of sale model.  As in the geometric depreciation
model, the results indicate that goods sold through the private liquidation sale sold for higher
prices relative to their replacement costs.  The annual rate of depreciation of these goods appears
to be similar to the goods that sold at public auction, as shown in Table 8.
All of the estimated models point to the same pattern.  The selling firm received higher
prices on goods it sold to aerospace firms rather than outsiders.  Similarly, with the exception of
the two pieces of structural equipment, the selling firms received significantly higher prices on the
goods sold through private liquidation rather than through the public auction.
C.  Time Costs of Capital Mobility
Finally, we present evidence on the length of time the capital was out of production or
underutilized before it was sold.  To maintain the confidentiality of the manufacturer, we denote
the time of the auction by year 0.
In Plant 1, about which we know the most, employment and production declined by some
75 percent between years -5 and -1.  In year -1 (approximately 13 months before the beginning of
the equipment sales),  the manufacturer decided to discontinue operations.  Between year -1 and
the auction, production gradually slowed, and reached zero at the time of the auction.  The last
delivery occurred two months after the auction.   The announcement to shut down Plant 2 was
made a little over a year before the first auction.  Production had dropped considerable in the
years leading up the announcement, and continued to decline until the last equipment was sold.
Thus, in one sense the sale of capital was swift, for it coincided with the point when
production fell to zero.  Capital utilization rates, however, were low both in the few years leading33
up to the decision to discontinue operations and during the year of winding down.  Thus, there
was a prolonged period of declining utilization before the capital was eventually sold.
One aspect that struck us was that in some respects the dismantling of the enterprise
resulted in the more efficient use of the capital, by allowing it to be sold.  In contrast, there was
another time at which production was low, but no capital was sold.  For almost an entire decade
in its existence, one of the facilities operated at very low levels of production with fewer than 500
employees.  During this time, most of the equipment and structures were unutilized.   The
combination of our economic depreciation estimates with current option value theories of
investment suggest that this was optimal behavior on the part of the firm.  Nevertheless, this
behavior represented substantial under-utilization of resources.
The final issue on timing is the lag between the purchase of the capital by the buyers and
the use of that capital in production.  We do not have information on this issue, but we can offer
some speculation.  It is likely that many pieces of equipment were used in production within a few
months of purchase, since they did not require much setup.  The outcome of the equipment that
was sold to dealers is more uncertain.  It would interesting to find out how many dealers were
able to resell the equipment quickly, and how many dealers held the equipment in inventory for
speculation purposes.
We draw two conclusions on timing from this analysis.  First, any prolonged decrease in
production probably results in significant periods of under-utilization of capital.   Second, because
of the large discounts experienced on the sale of capital, the option value of a piece of installed
capital is very high.  Thus, firms may rationally choose to hold on to capital for long periods of
time in case production might rise in the future.  It is only at times when firms decide to cease
operations that they sell significant portions of their capital.34
V. Interpretation of Empirical Results
We now discuss the implications of our empirical results for the costs of reversing
investment decisions and the costs of capital reallocation.  We will begin by discussing several
issues, including wedges between sellers’ receipts and buyers’ values and the applicability of this
aerospace study to other situations.
The first point to note is that the price received by the seller is less than the value of the
equipment to the buyer.  There are several reasons for this wedge.  First, standard auction theory
suggests that the price paid at auction is equal to the second highest valuation.  The distance
between the first and second highest valuation depends on the distribution of valuations of the
buyers.  Since we were told that there were usually a good number of bidders on many items, we
are led to believe that this wedge is not too large.  A second wedge between the price received by
the sellers and the value to the buyers is the fraction that is paid to the auction company.  The
prices we recorded are prices received by the sellers, not the price paid by the buyers.  Typically
buyers must pay an additional buyers premium of approximately ten percent.  Thus, the buyers’
values are at least ten percent greater than the prices received by sellers.
Our results suggest that sellers receive low prices on their sales of capital.  There are
various alternative explanations, such as lemons markets or the quality of the capital, that could
explain these results.  We believe that these explanations are less plausible than the one we offer in
our theoretical model.  First, as mentioned earlier, the equipment sold is not subject to the usual
lemons problems because the plants we study were among the last closed, and all of the
equipment was sold.  Furthermore, our sample selection device for estimating depreciation rates
for equipment that sold for $10,000 or more should bias our estimates upward.    Second, it is35
unlikely that the large discounts were due to poor quality equipment.  Industry sources report that
the equipment in the aerospace industry is typically well-maintained (Robert Levy (1996)).
Finally, it is unlikely that the high discounts are due to technological obsolescence.  There has not
been much technological advance in the type of machine tools used in aerospace manufacturing.
The only advance is the use of computer numerical control, which can be added to existing
machines (Robert Levy (1996)).  In fact, many of the rebuilds in our sample consist of the
addition of computer numerical control.  Thus, we do not believe that lemons problems,
equipment quality or technological obsolescence can explain much of the results we found.
It is also important to discuss the applicability of these results to other cases of capital
sales.  Our study is of an industry in the midst of a dramatic downsizing.  One would expect the
capital losses to be greatest in such a case.  Thus, we would not expect a firm that sold capital due
to idiosyncratic reasons to experience such large capital losses.  On the other hand, the type of
equipment used in the aerospace industry can more readily be used by other sectors than many
other types of equipment.  One of the auction experts told us that in rating the ability to sell
capital to other sectors, where 0 implies no resale ability and 10 indicates great resale ability, the
aerospace industry ranks a 10 compared to the steel industry at a 2.  Thus, one might expect other
industries to suffer much larger losses during a downturn.
With these factors in mind, we now offer what we believe to be reasonable implications
from our results.
1.  Investment is very costly to reverse, especially during a sectoral downturn36
 Our results provide direct evidence on the losses incurred when a firm must sell its capital during
a large sectoral downturn.  For the subset of goods for which we had information, the estimates
from the geometric depreciation model imply losses of 63 percent relative to the replacement
value.  Even without the two structural items, the losses were 43 percent.  This degree of
irreversibility can have a major effect on investment behavior, as shown by the theoretical results
of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Abel and Eberly (1994).
2.  Capital displays significant sectoral specificity
According to the auction experts, we are studying one of the sectors with the least specific
types of capital.  Yet our calculations of the distribution of capital across sectors showed that
aerospace was more heavily represented among the buyers than one would expect if the capital
were perfectly fungible.  Furthermore, we estimate significant additional discounts in price on
capital that sold outside the sector.  The loss on the median good was 64 percent if sold outside of
aerospace compared to 44 percent if sold to aerospace.
These results suggest an enormous degree of sectoral specificity.  Consider these estimates
in the context of the model we presented in which the values to each type of buyer were related to
the marginal revenue product (f) times the quality of the match (S) (equations (1) – (3)).   During
the time of our study, the marginal revenue product of capital in aerospace relative to other
sectors plummeted.  Yet, the value of much of the equipment to aerospace was still significantly
higher than to outsiders.  This fact implies a huge gap in the quality of the match of the capital
characteristics to insiders versus outsiders.  Owing to the low state of demand for aerospace, our
estimates are a lower bound on the value of specificity.37
3.  Sectoral specificity of capital and thinness of resale markets combine to reduce the
economic value of reallocated capital.
As discussed above, the value of the capital to the buyers exceeds the price received by sellers by
at least 10 to 15 percent, so the losses in economic value are not as great as the losses to the
selling firm.  Some of the difference between the selling and buying price must be paid to
auctioneers and dealers, so part of the wedge should be seen as a cost of capital mobility.  But
there is evidence of an economic cost even beyond that amount.  Even if the buyers’ values were
20 to 50 percent above the purchase price, the results would still indicate a fall in economic value
for the used capital.
According to our theory, the combination of sectoral specificity and thinness of markets
impedes the efficiency of matching capital to new owners.  Thus, reallocated capital is often
placed in a lower value use.  If one could costlessly break down a wind tunnel into its constituent
elements and costlessly reformulate it into another piece of equipment, it would have much higher
economic value than the immutable wind tunnel that sold outside the aerospace sector.
The loss in value appears to be much higher than that found for workers in the aerospace
industry by Schoeni et. al. (1996)).  It is difficult, however, to make a direct comparison to the
estimates presented in their study, because they were unable to track individuals who left
California.  Thus, the estimates they present are for only subsamples.  It is unlikely, though, that
the unobserved group had such large losses that they would raise the average loss to labor to
anything near the estimates we found for capital.38
IV.  Conclusions
    In this paper, we have argued that the cost of reallocating capital in response to sectoral
shifts has been overlooked.  We presented a theoretical model that showed how sectoral
specificity of capital and thinness of resale markets could result in low value matches between
reallocated capital and buyers.  Our empirical results indicate significant costs of capital mobility.
There are three separate manifestations of these impediments.  First, the equipment sales were
concentrated in the aerospace industry to a much greater extent than if equipment was not
specialized by industry.  Second, equipment that shifted sectors suffered a higher loss of economic
value than equipment that stayed in the same industry.  Finally, the winding down of operations
involved significant periods of time of very low capital utilization.
These results suggest that capital specialization deserves much more study.  It is likely that
studying capital flows jointly with worker flows will greatly increase our understanding of these
and other phenomena.39
Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first demonstrate why conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient to guarantee the existence of
an n* between 1 and N.   Consider Figure 1, which shows graphs of VO(n) and VA(n) against n.
Note that time move backwards as n increases, since higher n means that the firm has more units
left to sell.  Condition (i) guarantees that VA(n) is below VO(n) when n=1.  This case will be true
as long as the expected value of drawing from aerospace is sufficiently low when only one unit is
left.  Condition (ii) guarantees that VA(n) is above VO(n) for some n < N. This second condition
will hold if q ¢ R n A( )is sufficiently large.  These two conditions together imply that the curves must
cross, and there is at least one crossing where VA(n) crosses VO(n) from below.  It is clear that
once the firm has n £ n*-1 units left, it is optimal to sell all remaining units to sector O.
Furthermore, at n* it is optimal to sell one unit to sector A before selling all remaining units to
sector O.
It remains to be shown that for n > n*, it is not optimal to sell all remaining units to sector
O.  Consider the value of liquidating an amount k when n units are left to sell.  k > n - n* would
imply that n – k < n*, meaning the firm would not sell any units to sector A.  Thus, we need to
show that the value of this strategy is less than the value of selling k < n - n* units to sector O.
The value of selling k > n - n* units to sector O is given by   W n k k R W n k O O ( , ) ( ) = + - .
However,  since n – k < n*, we know that W n k n k RO ( ) ( ) - = - , since once the firm has less than
n* units left, we know it wants to sell them all to sector O.  So the value of selling k > n – n*
units to sector O at n > n* is simply the value of selling all remaining units to sector O,
W n k nR for k n n O O ( , ) , * = > - .  But we know that nR n n R W n O O < - + ( *) ( *) since40




Consider the firm’s decision when n> n* units are left to sell.  The value of searching for a buyer
from sector A is:
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whereas the value of selling the first k units to outsiders is given by:
(A-2) W n k k R W n k O O ( , ) ( ) = + -
(W(n-k) is the value of the optimal decision when n-k units are left.)  In order for the firm to
choose to search in sector A, we require that WA(n) > WO(n,k).  Substitution of equations (A-1)
and (A-2) into this condition show that it will hold if the following condition holds:
(A-3) q b qb b R n C R W n A O ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - > - + + - - 1 1 141
How do we guarantee that (A-3) holds?  We know that a similar condition holds at n* (by the
definition of n*).  Thus, as long as the left hand side (A-3) is increasing faster in n for n*<n<N
than the right hand side, the firm will not sell units to sector O while it is still searching for sector
A buyers.  Taking derivatives of each side, and noting that
¢ - =
- - - - -
- +
£
- - - - -
- +
W n
R n C W n R n C n R A A O ( )










it is clear that condition (iii) of Corollary 1 is sufficient to establish that WA(n) > WO(n,k).
￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
At the point where VO(n) and VA(n) cross, q b q b R n C n R A O ( ) [( ) * ] - = - + 1 , where  n* is the
last unit sold to aerospace before the public auction takes place. We implicitly differentiate this
equation with respect to n* and the parameters.  The effects of the parameters on n*, and thus on
the number of units sold to aerospace, are easily established with condition (iv), plus the fact that
n* > q and RA(n*) > b  RO.
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Table 1
Distribution of Sales by Industry: All Sales Included
Industry Percent of Sales Value Percent of Buyers







Other Manufacturing 4.0 6.1














Rest of U.S. 32.3 9.9
Foreign 4.0 0.8
Note: Data from Plants 1, 2, and 3 are included in these tables.47
Table 2
Distribution of Sales by Industry: Private Liquidation Sales
Industry Percent of Sales Value Percent of Buyers







Other Manufacturing 0.7 4.5














Rest of U.S. 54.6 59.0
Foreign 9.0 4.6
Note: Data from Plant 1 are included in this table.48
Table 3
Distribution of Sales by Industry: Public Auctions
Industry Percent of Sales Value Percent of Buyers







Other Manufacturing 5.1 6.2














Rest of U.S. 24.8 9.0
Foreign 2.3 0.8
Note: Data from Plants 1, 2, and 3 are included in these tables.49
Table 4
Depreciation Estimates: Geometric Depreciation Model






C0 (constant term) 14,584.4
(7474.8)








d d (annual depreciation) 0.076
(0.051)
d d on machine tools 0.122
(0.013)














a a on machine tools 0.391
(0.077)






a a  on structures

















2 0.303 0.822 0.825
The p-value of the likelihood ratio test of the preferred model against the heterogeneous capital
model is 0.83.







, where Im is the median reflated original
acquisition cost.50
Table 5
Distribution of Buyer Type and Mode of Sales in Depreciation Subsample
(percentages based on value of purchases)
A.  Percent Distribution of Buyer Type by Mode of Sale
Private Liquidation Sale Public Auction Total
Aerospace 91.5 8.5 100
Other 25.0 75.0 100





Public Auction 8.5 91.5 10051
Table 6
Depreciation Estimates by Type of Buyer and Sale





















































































125 125 125 125
Log Likelihood
Function
-1485.37 -1480.97 -1480.76 -1478.40
P-value of LRT against
model in column 4
0.076 0.09452
Table 7
Flexible Functional Form Estimates
Dependent variable: log(sales price/reflated original cost)
(regressions weighted by reflated original cost)
By type of buyer By mode of sale













Dummy for rebuilds -0.783
(0.183)












































Implied Depreciation Rates by Age
(Flexible functional form model)
By Buyer By Mode of Sale
Age Aerospace Outsiders Private
Liquidation
Public Auction
1 0.225 0.074 0.081 0.096
5 0.192 0.063 0.073 0.082
10 0.148 0.050 0.063 0.063
15 0.102 0.037 0.052 0.045
20 0.053 0.023 0.041 0.026